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I.

INTRODUCTION
Societies have confronted problems of environmental

degradation since at least the Egyptian period. Many of these
problems have been specific to particular societies, and thus
remedial actions, in the form of laws, have varied widely in degree
and target. Nonetheless, they reveal a consistent concern among
law makers regarding the rates of natural resource consumption
and environmental degradation. The earliest recorded official
prohibitions like that by Ikhnathon, King of Egypt, more than three
thousand years ago involved the implementation of crudely worded
statements of penalties to be imposed in the event that a
marshland was destroyed or that trees in a certain area were cut
down by unauthorized individuals. Others were established on
independent initiative, by the Assyrian Kings, beginning with
Tiglathpileser I, in the eleventh century B.C.; the Greeks from the
period of Xenophon (ca. 360 B.C.) onward; the Indian rulers
beginning with Ashoka; the Chinese form the reign of Hsiaohsuan
(ca. 100 B.C.); the Romans from A.D. 23; the Mongol Kubla! Khan; the
1

Aztec Montezuma; the Inca Pachacuti and many more.
With increasing technological advancement came ever more
elaborate prohibitions, both in wording and effect, but in the last

1 Robert M. Alison, The Earliest
ENVIRONMENT

Jan.-Feb. 1989.

Traces

of a Conservation

1

Conscience,

2

few generations

mankind's ability to deal with the problem of

environmental

degradation

has itself been transformed.

understanding

of the environment

Our

has not kept pace with our

capacity to alter it, and our ability to control our impact has fallen
far behind. The visible and imminent impacts of our newly
acquired powers have forced us to recognize

that the environment

consists of scarce and exhaustible resources. Therein lies the
current

threat.

The United States and other nations around the world
currently

are facing increasingly

environmental

challenges

difficult

and perilous

that embrace global climate change,

indoor pollution,

stratospheric

smog, infectious

wastes on the shorelines,

of underground
Together,

ozone depletion,

acid rain, urban

invisible

contamination

water supplies, and the degradation

of public lands.

they threaten to destablize the very planet we live on.

Thus, we must arrest the wasteful and destructive
have launched
Legislatures,

and enlarged
agencies

goals and implement
Admittedly,
environmental

that

challenges.

and the courts must establish

environmental

reforms.

there was significant

legislation

now the environmental
persuasive

these environmental

practices

federal and state

in the late 60's and the early 70's, but
challenges

are more serious, more

and more varied in nature and impact. The rising

dangers to our environment

and our heightened

awareness

of these

threats call for new thinking, new inquiry, and above all new
approaches.

3

The most promising approach is to harness market forces to
spur technological
resources.
rational
addresses

regulators

management

of natural

This thesis explores how economics can stimulate
solutions
strategies

environmental
incentives

advance and sustainable

to environmental

It specifically

that have been implemented

protection

for businesses
requIre.

problems.

and economic
and individuals

to increase

productivity

by providing

to go beyond what

II.

CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Over the past two decades many theories of regulatory
reform have been advocated

which would give our environmental

law a "new legal direction". But regulatory reform is easier said
than done. The controversy

begins when one moves as Winston

Churchill said, "From the wonderful c10udland of aspiration to the
ugly scaffolding

of attempt and achievement.

interest, few proposals
implementation.
exception

"2

Despite intense

survive the perilous path from concept to

Market-based

pollution

control policy is a notable

even though it alters the way regulators

approach

pollution control. Its origins can be traced far back to Dales3, and
the subsequent
Bruce

writings of Montgomery4, DeLucia5,

Ackerman

7

Tietenberg6,

and Stephen Breyer8•

2 Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science and Democracy, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 19, 24 (1985).
3 Dales 1., Pollution, Property and Principle, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
(1968).
4 Montgomery David, Market Licences and Efficient Market Control
Programs, J. ECON. THEORY, 395 (1972).
5 De Lucia Russel, Evaluation of Effluent Permit Systems, OFF. RES. DEV. U.S.
WASH. (1973).
6 Tietenberg T. H., Property Rights for Air Pollution Control, 22 PUB. POL'Y. 29
(1974).
7 Rose & Bruce Ackerman, Market Models for Air Pollution Control: Strengths
and Weaknesses, 25 PUB. POL'Y 283 (1978).
8 Stephen Breyer, Regulation
and Its Reform, Cambridge Mass. Harv. U. Press
(1982).

4

5
As the decade of the 1990's begins, political leaders are
increasingly
achieve

embracing

sustained

market-based

environmental

regulatory

progress.

approaches

as acceptable

preferences

and are thus egalitarian.

strategies

Liberals

to

view market

because' they are neutral among
Conservatives

markets are good because they reward traditional

assert that
virtues such as

thrift and hard work while punishing

all vices. Nearly everyone

agrees that markets are advantageous

insofar as they are

impersonal

and relieve the government

consequences

of choices individuals

of responsibility

for the

make.9

The current policy debate looks very different from the time
when economic incentives were characterized
pollute"

or dismissed

Johnson's proposal
recommendations

as completely

as a "licence to

impracticable.10

President

for effluent fees11 and President Nixon's
for a tax on lead in gasoline and a sulphur

dioxide emission fee were dismissed with little consideration. 12
Now, however, economic incentive policies for enhancing
environmental

quality have moved to center stage in Washington

and a number of state capitals.13
In the 1980's, Congress was jolted into action by several
highly publicized

environmental

disasters

and began debate on

9 See generally SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977).
10 See AIm, The Post Regulatory
Environmental
Protection
Regime, 23 ENVTL.
SCI. & TECH. 1338 (1989).
11 Id.
12Id.
13 See Hahn, Robert W. & Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based
Environmental
Regulation: A New Era From An Old Idea? 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. (1991).
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fundamental
political

restructuring

stalemates

of environmental

prevented

the tenure of President

any legislation

Reagan15 incentive

law.14 Although
on this front during
based strategies

were

being deployed by 1988 to address specific problems. On June 12,
1989, President Bush proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act.
The act's central feature was to introduce

a market-oriented

approach for controlling acid rain, which involves a free trading of
sulphur dioxide "allowances" and is expected to provide flexibility,
efficiency,

conservation

problems.16

and innovation

in solving pollution

This proposal was sent to Congress on July 2, 1989, In

the form of a bill introduced by Congressman John Dingall17 and a
companion piece was introduced in the Senate by Senator John
Chafee.18

In early April 1990, the Senate passed its version of the

Clean Air Bill, with a tradable system patterned after the one
proposed in the administration

bill.19 The House of Representatives

did likewise in May20 and in November, President Bush signed the
compromise between the House and the Senate Bills, calling for a
market-based

approach

to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions

by 10

United States v. Shell Oil Co. 605, F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (D. Colo. 1985).
15 Although the Reagan administration had embraced a market oriented
ideology, it demonstrated little interest in applying actual market-oriented
policies in the environmental area. To its credit, the Reagan administration
had endorsed a market-based approach for removing lead from gasoline, but
it targeted its energies mostly at the development and enhancement of the
regulatory approach. See ENVIRONMENTALPOLICY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE
ORDER:THE ROLE OF BENEFITCOSTANALYSIS.(V. SMITHed. 1984).
16 H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), 135 CONGoREC. H4440-52, § 218
(Mobile Emission Sources), § 401 (Permits), § 501 (Acid Rain).
17 H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
18 S. 1490. 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
19 S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
20 H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
14 See

7

million tons.21 Now Congress is considering bills that would apply
economic incentive
pollution

mechanisms

to problems as diverse as water

waste management.22

and hazardous

Several factors stimulated

ihis renewed interest

III

economic

incentives and their incorporation in legislation such as Title IV of
the Clean Air Act. The cost of environmental compliance has
reached about 90 billion dollars per annum, an increase of about 40
percent
improve

since

1984.23 It is increasingly unlikely that we can

environmental

protection

simply by spending

more money

on programs and policies already in place.
Political realignment

is another reason for the change

attitude. The Bush regime perceives
accommodate

many moderate

though cost-effective,

an opportunity

III

this

to

voters by taking an aggressive,

stand on environmental

concerns.24

In a poll

conducted in July 1991, 76 percent of the people interviewed
favoured

economic

incentives

to encourage

the development

and

use of less polluting technology by U.S. businesses while only 9
percent

opposed

them.25

The new environmental

concerns at both the global and

national levels, and the growing recognition of their worth is
21 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
22 More than 100 bills characterized by EPA as using economic incentives
were introduced in the 101st Congress. See U.S. EPA, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN
PENDING ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, Office of Policy Planning & Evaluation,
Washington D.C., July 1990.
23 See Farber & Rulledge, Pollution
Abatement
and Control Expenditures,
66
SURV.CURRENTBUS. 94, 97 (1986).
24 See The Politics and Religion of Clean Air Regulations, WINTER 1990, at 22.
25 Poll: Environment
USA 91, American Political Network, Inc. Greenwire
July 9, 1991.

8

prompting

a dramatic change in the political landscape of

environmental

policy. Within the last two years lawmakers,

environmentalists,
recognized

bureaucrats,

business

persons

and citizens

have

that market based apprmlches belong to our portfolio

environmental

and natural

resource

policies.

of

III.

THEORY OF MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES

Market-based
environmental
adequate

environment

protection

incentives

policies

seek to achieve

on a low cost basis while providing

for improved

performance.

Polluters

complied with existing controls should have incentives
reduce pollution.
environmental

who have
to further

Market forces can stimulate rational solutions to

problems,

but the sources of regulatory

failure must

be first identified.

A.

CONVENTIONAL

COMMAND-AND-CONTROL

REGULATORY MECHANISMS: STRUCTURE AND
FAILINGS

Traditionally
been

the U.S. philosophy

"command-and-control"

have "commanded"

.26

of environmental

Statutes, regulations,

law has

and policies

polluters to achieve the appropriate

levels of

pollution "control". Two policy mechanisms have been commonly
used to control
standards

environmental

and performance

try to identify the particular

pollution:
standards.

technology-based
Technology-based

standards

equipment that must be used to

26 See, e.g., Davis, Approaches to the Regulation of Hazardous Waste, 18
ENVTL. L. 505 (1988); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative
Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256 (1981).
9

10
comply with a regulation

and performance

standards try to achieve

a specific goal.
Although

uniform

technology-based

and performance

standards may be effective in achieving some established

goals and

standards, they often do so at a very high cost to the society,
imposing billions of dollars in compliance costs and causing a
decrease

in productivity,

technological

innovation

and market

competition.27

According to a report by EPA, the total expenditures

by individuals,

private businesses

government

for compliance

and various levels of

with federal

environmental

regulations

now amount to about $155 billion annually.28 By the year 2000,
according to the EP A, annual compliance expenditures

will have

grown to $171 billion, in 1990 dollars.29 To provide some
perspective

on these numbers, the $155 billion EPA spent in 1990

is almost 40 percent of all defense spending and is about equal to
the amount the U.S. spent for medicare and medicaid assistance
combined. The $155 billion was 2.1 percent of the Gross National
Product (GNP) and is expected to rise to 2.6 percent by the year
2000.30
These regulatory
improve anti-pollution

mechanisms

fail to provide incentives

devices. Where the polluter

to

has complied

with existing controls, he has no incentive for improved
27 For some estimates of costs resulting from this approach, see Hahn &
Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q.
361, 368-76 (1989).
28 See generally U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTS: THE COST OF A CLEAN
ENVIRONMENT at v-vii (1990).
29 [d.
30 Paul R. Portney, Katherine N. Probst & Adam M. Finkel. The EPA at "Thirty
Something", 21 ENVTL. L. 1461 (1991).
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performance.

The present permit system tells the polluter

how

much of the regulated pollutants he can discharge. It has the big
drawback of being non-transferable

because a polluter is obliged to

cut back his own wastes even if it is' cheaper for him to pay his
neighbor to do the extra cleanup instead.31 The inevitable
drawbacks

are increasingly

centralization,

rigidity,

apparent:

cost, litigation

The command-and-control
of regulatory

requirements

excessive

bureaucratic

and delay.

approaches

usually

take the form

of the "Best Available Technology"

(BAT). If an industry generates any pollution, it must install
whatever technology

is available to reduce or eliminate the

pollution, so long as the cost of doing so does not cause a shutdown
of the plant or industry. BAT requirements used in many fields of
environmental

regulation,

including

air and water pollution,

millions of dollars every year by ignoring variations

waste

among plants

and industries in the cost of reducing pollution and by ignoring
geographical

variations

in pollution

demands in regulating

several

effects.32 To cope with the
industrial

sources

of pollution and over a million hazardous waste generators,

federal

regulators rely on "wholesale"
environmental

variables.

uniform requirements

thousand

standards and ignore the local

In view of these variables,

are widely inefficient.

sensible to impose identical
industries, regardless

hundred

technological

nationally

It does not seem
requirements

on diverse

of whether they pollute or are clean, or

31 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Marketable
Control, LAND USE & ENVTL. L. REV. 401 (1987).
32 Latin, Ideal Versus Regulatory
Efficiency:
Implementation
Standards & "Fine Tuning", 37 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1985).

Pollution
of

Uniform

12
expensive or cheap to cleanup. If controls were tailored to
individual

plants,

our current expenditure

for air and water

pollution could be reduced from over $50 billion annually to $25
billion or less with no sacrifice of overall environmental
Such tailoring,
centralized

however, is an administrative

quality.

impossibility

33

in a

system of regulation.

The problems

go deeper still. BAT requirements

usually apply

only to new entrants to the market. By requiring all new industry
to adopt costly technology while allowing existing plants and
industries to conform to more lenient standards, BAT strategies
penalize new products.

Further, regulatory

screening

is biased

against new plants and products, which must undergo a costly, time
consuming,

and uncertain

process of regulatory

clearance

before

they can be built or placed on the market.34 They do not provide
strong incentives
superior strategies
Such innovations
growth, without
of regulation

for the development

of new environmentally

and may in fact discourage
are important
simultaneously

for maintaining
increasing

Regulation

long-term

pollution.35

should by to promote technological

pollution control.

their development.
economic

A large goal

innovation in

should increase rather than decrease

incentives.
A large part of the defect, a regulatory paradox, lies in the
stringency of the BAT approach.36

Strict regulation,

applied

33 See Richard B. Stewart, controlling
Environmental
Risks
Through
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 157 (1988).
341d.
35 See J. KRIER & EURSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY, 24-27 (1977).
36 See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative
Substance, DUKE L.J. 607, 629 (1991).
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universally

without regard to the diversity of the regulated

will bring about overregulation
exceptionally

forcing people to incur

high costs for speculative

stringent

controls

stringent

regulatory

fight regulation

even produce
standards

gains.37 The paradox

underregulation.

give industry

that

IS

Threat of

powerful

wherever they can and regulators

incentives

to

a powerful

incentive for inaction. The agencies thus promulgate
fewer regulations.

class,

stringent but

This tendency is reflected by the fact that the

government has regulated only seven toxic air pollutants

out of

hundreds,38

fewer than a dozen water toxic pollutants, again out of

hundreds,39

and only ten toxic substances in the workplace,

although the recommended

level of exposure limits to hundreds of

chemicals.4o
In addition BAT strategies
enforce, imposing

extra-ordinary

are extremely expensive
monitoring

burdens

to

on agencies

that employ them.41 This system of control imposes a massive
information

gathering

complex scientific,

burden on administrators

engineering

to determine

the

and economic issues regarding

the

feasibility of control on hundreds and thousands of pollution

37 See 1. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION, 24-26

" (1988).
38 See note, Towards Sensible Regulation
of Hazardous Air Pollutants
under
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 613-14 (1988).
39See F. ANDERSON, E. MANDELKER & D. TARLOK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
439-43 (1990).
40 See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 37, at 2.
41 See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR,REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH FOR FISCAL YEAR 1988 xiv (1990) ($151,702,000 out of total OSHA
1988 fiscal year budget of $235,474,000 allocated to federal and state
enforcement)
.
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sources. Even when the administration
to strong enforcement,
standards

in Washington

is committed

federal agencies cannot themselves

enforce

against hundreds and thousands of plants. The will and

the ability of federal and state agencies is often eroded by limited
resources.

Thus non-compliance

environmentally

inappropriate

likely to be unworkable

is widespread.
centralized

Further

uniform

standards

are

or arbitrary in many applications.

This provides a fertile ground for complex litigation which
may be more-cost
industry challenges
and analytical
protracted

effective for the industry than compliance.42
administrative

justifications

administrative

discretion

as well as the factual

for agency regulations
hearings

that delay the implementation

The

and judicial

through

review

of these programs.43

proceedings

The firms end

up spending more money on lawyers than on cleanup. A recent
study indicates that large corporations
superfund type claims between
billion of that went to lawyers.44

spent about $1.3 billion on

1986 and 1989, and about $1
According to researchers,

the

lawyers' share could easily have funded cleanups of 40 polluted
sites. Even environmental

groups disgruntled

with the system of

regulatory control resort to the courts to challenge the laxity of the
regulators
enforcement.

and mandate
45

administrative

Repeated litigation

implementation

by industry

and

and environmental

42 See Stewart, supra note 26.
43 Id; See also S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT 193 (1983).
44 M. Moses, Insurers Payouts Over Superfund Flow to Lawyers, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, April 24, 1992. p.Bl; See also Marianne Lavelle. Study Measures
Superfund Costs, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 4, 1992, p.3.
45 See Richard B. Stewart, supra note 33, at 157.
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groups, challenging
of regulatory

the scientific,

economic and engineering

details

decisions also burdens the courts and strains their

competence.
Further,

BAT strategies

are aimed at superficial

symptoms

rather than focussing on the real causes of pollution. For example,
EPA until now had forced coal-fired power plants to adopt costly
"scrubbing"

strategies

to deal with sulphur dioxide emissions,46

while a far more useful approach would be the use of financial
incentives

to encourage

and efficiency

industry

to increase

energy conservation

and to shift to cleaner renewable fuels.

A final defect in these regulatory approaches is that they are
severely deficient

from the standpoint

political

The system undermines

process.

accountability

of environmental

Congress to delegate
to formulate
problems.
priorities

of a well-functioning
the democratic

policy decisions.

enormous discretion

standards

regulating

are buried in thousands

to federal bureaucracies

different

Choices about environmental

It requires

environmental

protection

goals and

of highly technical

standard-

setting decisions made by agencies and reviewed by courts. The
decision-making
organized

process

industry

is dominated

and environmental

citizens and representatives
and nearly impenetrable

representing

groups.47 Further, the

focus attention

questions

rather than the 'appropriate'

by lawyers

on largely incidental

about the 'available'

technology.

technology

This focus on the 'means'

46 See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
47 See Richard B. Stewart, supra note 33, at 158.
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increases

the power of well-organized

private groups by allowing

them to use the system for their own parochial ends.
Thus, our regulatory

system is self-defeating

as it brings

about results that are precisely opposite to those intended; it
strangles

investment

and innovation;

it encourages

costly litigation

and delay; and it unduly limits private initiative and choice. The
centralized

command-and-control

system is simply unacceptable

a long term strategy for environmental
committed

B.

protection,

to the market and decentralized

MARKETABLE

as

for a nation

ordering.

POLLUTION CONTROL: A SOLUTION TO

THE DILEMMA

Economic incentives do not dictate the conduct of each of the
hundreds

and thousands

of enterprises.

Instead they impose a

price or economic cost on conduct that creates pollution or chemical
risk, leaving to each enterprise the decision on the exact level of
control. Under these systems, the decision as to how much and how
to control is made on an individual basis by each plant or
enterprise. A central principle is that as consumers and as
producers, each and everyone
costs and consequences

of us needs to weigh the full social

of our decisions before we act. This

principle applies, for example, to our decisions as consumers to use
products like lead acid batteries and to dispose of them at
municipal landfills,

where the lead can contaminate

ground water

or our decisions as producers to use such technology that may
inject acid rain causing sulphur dioxide into the atmosphere.

17

By changing the incentives

an individual faces, that individual

can use his typically superior information to select the best means
of meeting his responsibility.

Regulators can persuade polluters

respect nature by making it worthwhile

for them.48 This

decentralized

incentive

important

flexibility

advantages

Market-based

gives economic
over

command-and-control

environmental

policy

various ways to make the consumers
social costs and consequences
incentives

for environmental

industrial

pollutants;

containerized
efficiency;

hazardous

removal

use; and removal
destructive

systems several
regulations.

mechanisms

provide

and producers recognize

the

of their decisions and thus provide
protection:

pollution

to

charges;

tradable

permits

deposit-refund

wastes; least-cost

bidding

subsidies

systems

for

for greater

of barriers that promote inefficient
of unwarranted

for

resource

for environmentally

activities.

There are social costs of dumping things in the aIr, III the
ground and III the water. Instead of a central planning technique
that tells each firm what it should do and some administrators

in

Washington trying to decide that technique, the idea is to use the
price signal to tell the industry, "This is the cost of pollution, but it
is up to you to find the cheapest way of minimizing that cost." Each
business has the freedom to devise the control methods that are
most appropriate,

effective

and the cheapest for its particular

circumstances. Polluters can comply in any way so long as the
reduction of emissions,

48 See

Tietenberg,

supra

wastes and discharges is achieved. They

note 6.
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may trade their pollution rights, or buy and sell each others
permits, thereby creating

a powerful financial incentive

for those

who clean up most, most cheaply.
Overall, the total cost of achieving any given level of pollution
will be reduced under this system as opposed to the more uniform
command-and-control

regulation.

This reform will tend to bring

about a least cost allocation of control burdens saving many billions
of dollars annually by giving firms with relatively low control costs,
an incentive to control above the level required by uniform
regulation, while allowing firms with high costs to control less.
example, a market-based

approach to acid rain reduction

For

could

save $3 billion per year, compared to the cost of a dictated
technological

solution.49

The cost savings can vary but they can run

anywhere between 20 to 30 percent to 50 percent or more.50
The history of pollution control in the U.S. suggests that
rather than simply controlling
pollution by substituting
are more polluting.51

pollution,

we need to prevent that

less polluting technologies

Incentive-based

for those that

systems are the most

realistic way to move to a pollution prevention focus on our
environmental

programs.

They can provide inspiration

to the

private sector to develop new pollution control technologies

and

49 See ROGER K. RAUFER & STEPHEN L. FELDMAN, ACID RAIN AND EMISSIONS
TRADING: IMPLEMENTING A MARKET APPROACH TO POLLUTION CONTROL (Totowa,
N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield,
1987).
50 See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming
Environmental
Law:.The
Democratic
Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. 1. ENVTL. L. 171, 175-77 (1988); see also
Hahn & Hester, supra note 27.
51 B. COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET (1990).
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make money by doing so.52 Investments

in such technologies

can

lead to an increase in profits, thus providing significant
inducements

for firms to adopt new pollution control strategies

to carry out research
pollution

abatement

in controversy

and development
techniques.53

and

of cheaper and better

All this will simplify the issues

and facilitate a more intelligent

setting. Each firm

can monitor the other's process and get some inspiration from it.54
This system eliminates

disproportionate

imposes on new and more productive

burdens

industries.55

that BAT

There would be

no penalty imposed on new plants or products. All sources of
pollution will be subject to the same incentive levels and no plant
would have to go through a time-consuming
This policy carries the administrative
eliminating

review process.
advantage

most of the information-processing

overwhelm the bureaucracies

and the regulators.

required to conduct the endless proceedings

of

tasks that
EP A would not be

to determine the BAT

in each major industry in the U.S. and then to defend its decisions
before the courts, nor would federal and state agencies be required
to spend vast amounts of time and energy in adapting to the
changing national guidelines,
important pollution
environmental

to the particular

conditions

of every

source. This is not to suggest, however, that

protection

can be achieved

without

significant

,52 See LEVIN, GETTING TIIERE: IMPLEMENTING TIIE BUBBLE POLICY IN SOCIAL
~GULATION STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 59 (E. Bardach & R. Kagan, Eds. 1982).
!,53 See S. Milliman & Prince, Firm Incentives
to Promote Technological
Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL., ECON. & MGMT. 247, 247 (1989).
54 Firms would want to monitor other firms within their industry to identify
.ose that are diluting the value of their tradable permits by failing to
6omply.
See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, supra note 31, at 402.
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government
effective

expenditures,

since no program of control can be

without a commitment

and enforcement.
both regulatory

Monitoring

by the government

and enforcement

and economic incentive

would be cheating

and environmental

to monitoring

is a key element in

systems; without it there
degradation.

incentive system does, is to dramatically

What the

reduce the burden on the

agencies of central planning by the government. It puts the
information-processing

burden precisely

where it belongs;

upon

business managers and engineers who are in the best position to
figure out how to cut back on their pollution costs. If one polluter
can clean

up more cheaply than the other, he should be able to sell

some pollution rights to the second polluter at a mutually
advantageous

price.56

In addition, economic incentive systems can be used to
provide government
current regulations

with an important
polluters

source of revenue. Under

are using air and water resources

for

free. Economic incentive systems require the polluter to pay for
this privilege. Auctions and sales of pollution permits would raise
substantial sums of money for the government on a continuing
basis. Although no studies have yet been attempted to make
estimates of revenues that can be raised under this system, existing
estimates suggest that the revenues could equal the amount
polluters spend in cost-minimizing

control activities.57

Even if

returns turn out to be one-third of this amount, the government

56 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 50, at 180.
57 See T. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1985).
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would still be collecting more than $6 to $10 billion annually.58 It
seems reasonable

to suppose that Congress would allow the EP A

and other agencies to retain a share of these revenues.59
An added benefit of the incentive-based
tendency

to make the environmental

debate

approach is its
more understandable

to the general public.60 Because they do not dictate a particular
technology, these approaches

can focus attention directly on the

basics, on what our environmental
complex technical

goals should be rather than on

details concerning

technological

alternatives

for

reaching these goals. This can enhance the democratic
accountability

of environmental

policy decisions.61

A market system is most appropriate for a country like the
U.S., where the basic values of the social system are the sanctity of
private property,

limited government,

which are consistent

and individual

liberty,

all of

with the creation of property rights and

increased freedom of choice found in the market system.

C.

OBJECTIONS

AND OBSTACLES:

POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS

Economic incentives have often been criticized on the ground
that they lower basic human values by allowing the ecology and
the environment to be traded off in dollars. It is often argued that
it is immoral to establish a "license" or a "right to pollute". An
58 See

59Id.
60Id.

Ackerman

& Stewart,

supra

note 50, at 18!.

at 188-90.
61 Marshall J. Berger, Richard B. Stewart, E. Donald Elliot & David Hawkins,
Providing Economic
Incentives
in Environmental
Regulation,
8 YALE J. ON
REG. 463 (1991).
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excellent answer to this criticism is found in the words of W.J.
Boamol and W.E. Oats, in their book, Economics,

Environmental

Policy and the Quality of Life: "Society has been giving away free
too many of its environmental resources too long. It is not
scandalous to decide that everything has its price; the real scandal
lies in setting the price at zero or at some token level that invites
us to destroy these resources. Unless we recognize the legitimate
role of price incentives for the control of pollution, we may end up
with our sense of morality intact but our environment
for continued

the worse

abuse. "62

Pollution is an inevitable consequence of life at work and not
a product of moral turpitude. People have to live and congregate
somewhere, dispose of waste products,

and even use depletable

resources. These activities cannot be abolished, though they can be
controlled. Controlling

them means finding the proper balance

between the utility of these activities to the individual

and the

non-utility they impose on others. The market system assumes that
air and water have a certain assimilative

capacity; they have the

capacity to hold some wastes so long as safe limits are not
exceeded. Further, it may not even be correct to call it a "right to
pollute". Assigning a price to the temporary permission to pollute
does not convert it into a right. For example, in the acid rain
legislation, there is explicit language stating that the allowances to
emit sulphur dioxide, are not legal rights, but constitute
permission to release these pollutants,
62 BAUMOL & OATS, ECONOMICS. ENVIRONMENTAL

LIFE 245 (1979).

temporary

and that they can be further
POLICY AND THE QUALITY OF
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reduced by the action of the government consistent
traditional

actions of the government.6

with the

3

Besides this anxiety about the right to pollute,
environmentalists
environmental

are concerned

quality

objectives

that progress

towards

meeting

may be slowed and many

loopholes will be created.64 Even some industrial sources, the most
natural constituents
the flexibility

in the light of their potential cost savings and

of the program, fear that this flexibility

involves

greater risk. By reducing emissions more than required by law,
polluters could alert control authorities

to the fact that additional

control was possible, and control authorities might use this to
reverse the baseline. Moreover, state authorities
threatening

departure

from the customary

see it a a

way of doing business.

A serious objection to the use of tradable pollution permits is
that it could create "hot spots", that is, relatively high
concentrations

of particular

pollutants

population to high concentrations

in small areas, exposing the

of pollution.65

though genuine, can be avoided by developing
infrastructure

that will allow a sophisticated

This concern,
a regulatory

response to it. For

example under the acid rain trading program, the pollution
allowances for sulphur dioxide are not the only regulatory

regime

for sulphur dioxide that will apply to these individual power plants.
The plants still must protect against localized high concentrations

of

63 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-549, § 401, § 403(f), 104
Stat. 2399 (1990).
64 See Dolnger, The Dark Side of the Bubble, ENVTL. F. July 1985, at 33.
65 See Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory
Efficiency:
Implementation
of
Uniform Standards and "Fine Tuning", 37. STAN. L. REV. 69, 1267 (1985).
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pollution that may cause health effects or may cause other local
environmental
pre-existing

impacts,66 because this program is an overlay on a
program.

Another criticism of economic incentives is that there could
be hoarding of pollution permits. Fearing that the market will fail
to provide them with allowances

in future some industries

would

bank excess allowances for future insurance. The Clean Air Act
addresses this concern by creating a broad nationwide
ensure competitive

behavior.

market to

The annual auction of allowances

under the Clean Air Act will also foster confidence in the market,
since

the auction system guarantees future availability.

assurance would give potential

sellers greater confidence

will be able to buy back the allowances they contemplate

This
that they
selling.

Even where the market is not large, hoarding can be avoided
by the contracting

parties by writing clauses in the sale provisions

that cover contingencies

that would otherwise

from making

commitments.67

long-term

discourage

them

An example might be a

clause that provides for a right to retrieve some of the sold
allowances in the event the seller's margins fall behind a
predefined

level. Finally,

by the antitrust

anti-competitive

behavior

is constrained

laws.

Still other critics oppose economic incentive
because of their supposed political consequences.

systems

Legal commands

often invoke claims to vindicate rights to a clean and healthy
environment.

Such appeals generate political

66 See, T. TIETENBERG, supra note 57.
67 See Berger, Stewart, Elliott & Hawkins, supra

support for strong

note 61.
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control measures. Economic incentives
aspect of environmental

may make the economic

cleanup more explicit

and more apparent.

The critics fear that doing so may erode political support for
ambitious goals and may deprive them of this political platform.
The regulatory

appeal to environmental

rights is disingenuous

concealing the fact that command strategies
compromises

in setting

These compromises,

and implementing

In

involve major
environmental

goals.

however, are generally hidden from the public

view, buried in the technical details of regulatory rules and orders.
Economic incentives

may make the compromises

There are, however,

more apparent.

some issues of implementation

addressed. A key issues is the development

of the implementing

regulations needed to carry out economic incentive
aspect to be considered

with bureaucratic

impair efficient

trading has been criticized
too many bureaucratic

systems. One

is how to implement an incentive system

that is not so entangled
fundamentally

that must

requirements

trading. Historically,

that

EP A's emission

for burdening the trading process with

requirements

and safeguards.68

incentive system must also be consistent

The

with the other

.•requirements of law already in place. For example, the acid rain
provisions of the Clean Air Act have multiple goals, a major
.challenge is to make sure that all these provisions of law are
.harmonized in a way that meets the requirements
68 See Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets

146-57 (1989).
9 See, e.g., Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.
erto Rican Cement Co., Inc. v. EPA,
held the broad reach of the PSD
at a utility pollution control project

of law.69 If

Go?, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109,

v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990);
889 F.2d 292 (1st Cir. 1989) (which
modification provision, raising concerns
undertaken to comply with the acid
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initial market systems do not live up to expectations, there is a
great danger that the market-based
discredited.

In addition, there are many practical concerns that can

be legitimately
implementing

system could be seriously

raised about the feasibility
economic

incentive

of designing

systems in particular

and
settings.

Economic incentives are not a cure-all, and may not be suitable for
all types of environmental

problems. The real challenge is to

identify the right policy for each specific situation. The best set of
policies may typically involve a mix of market and more
conventional

regulatory

processes.

rain prOVIsIOns of the new act may subject the utility to rigorous PSD preconstruction
review
requirements.

IV.

MAJOR CATEGORIES OF INCENTIVE APPROACHES

The preceding
use and environmental

chapters

note that inefficient

degradation

can be curtailed

natural resource
best if

consumers and producers alike pay for the direct as well as the
indirect costs of their actions. Economic incentive systems can
provide various ways of doing this: pollution charges, tradable
permits,

deposit refund systems, reduction

elimination

of government

subsidies.

of market barriers,

These categories

and

are discussed

in this section.

A.

POLLUTION CHARGES

Pollution charges may, to some extent, be considered as a
"price" to be paid for pollution. Charge systems impose a tax or a
fee on each unit of pollution discharged and not simply on
pollution-generating

activities.70

For example, a pollution charge

may take the form of a charge per unit of sulphur dioxide, not a
charge per unit of electricity
firm will internalize

generated. Such charges ensure that a

the previously external pollution costs and will

be forced to perform a profit-loss calculation in order to respond
efficiently to the fee. It may be in the interest of the firm to pay
70 See A PIGDO, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1952) (A.G. Piguo is
generally credited with developing
the idea of a tax to discourage
activities
which
generate
externalities).
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the fee, completely

eliminate the discharge or partially reduce the

emission.
An effective charge system minimizes the aggregate cost of
pollution control and gives firms an on-going incentive to develop
and adopt newer and better pollution
can also contribute

indirectly

by raising funds necessary

towards

control technologies.

Charges

better environmental

for environmental

programs.

quality

An added

advantage of the fee system is that all firms face the same level of
incentives to control. A firm will control up to the point where the
marginal cost of control equals the fee. Thus the total costs of
pollution control are minimized, as compared with other methods of
allocating the pollution

control burdens across firms.

There are, however, some difficulties

with charges or taxes.

First, the government may be unable to specify a target level of
pollution that will be achieved with charges. It is not possible to
estimate how large a charge will be required to obtain a desired
level of pollution reduction. There is also uncertainty

about the

amount of total reduction that will be achieved by any given level
of charge as the precise responses of the firms to the charge will be
difficult to predict. Thus charges may have to be increased over
time, in order to achieve the same level of effect, if we assume
continued growth. Charges also impose significant

monitoring

burdens on the government. All this does not, however, alter the
reality that charges achieve significant emission reduction in a costeffective

manner.

Charge systems have not been widely adopted in the U.S., but
now some useful proposals

are underway to control pesticides

and

29
other toxic substances

through taxes.7! Strategies like "old car

taxes" and "gasoline taxes" have also been advocated to decrease
automobile

emission.72

Air and water pollution charges have been

adopted in France, West Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Norway,
Finland and The Netherlands.
remain interested
have, however,
rather than

B.

in further "green taxes".
been designed

as serious

instrumen ts.7

Several other European

primarily

incentive-based

nations

These charge systems
as revenue-raising

devices

environmental

3

TRADABLE PERMITS

Marketable
cost-minimizing

or tradable pollution

permits

achieve the same

allocation of the pollution control burden as a

charge, while at the same time avoiding the problem of uncertain
responses

by firms.74 Unlike a charge system, a system of tradable

permits allows the government to specify an overall level of
pollution that will be tolerated. This total quantity is allocated in
the form of permits among polluters. Polluters are allowed to trade
their pollution rights or to buy and sell each other's permits,
thereby creating

a powerful financial incentive for those who

71 See B. COMMENER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 97, 98 (1990).
72 See R. CRANDALL, H. GRUENSPECHT, T. KEELER & L. LAVE, REGULATING THE
AUTOMOBILE 75, 89-91 (1986).
73 See OPSCHOOR, 1. B. & HANS B. VOS, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
1989).
74 See HAHN & NOLL, REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 119 (W. Magat ed.

1982).
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cleanup most cheaply to sell their permits to those whose
treatment

costs are the highest.

Such a system will tend to minimize the total social cost of
achieving a given level of pollution control. As an example suppose
that A and B produce 100 tons of pollution each year. But suppose
for whatever reason, it costs A four times as much as B to eliminate
a ton of pollution. Under a strictly legalistic approach, we might
pass a law requiring that each reduce its emissions by half. But that
would mean that A will have to spend a lot more money to do what
B is doing cheaply. The perfect solution would be a tradable permit
system under which B will be able to reduce his pollution by, say,
75 tons and sell A the right to 25 tons of pollution. The result is the
same; overall pollution is reduced by half. But the bulk of the
pollution reduction would have been made by B who can do it more
cheaply. Both A and B and thus society would save money. As with
the charge system, the marginal cost of control is identical between
polluters and thus the total cost of pollution is minimized for any
given level of total pollution control.
In its ideal form, the system of tradable permits would make
two simple changes in the current law. First, it would require
polluters to pay to pollute. It would not, as current law does, allow
people to pollute for free. Second, pollution permits would be
tradable. A company that is able to reduce its pollution below the
permitted level could sell all or part of its permit to someone else.
In the unlikely event that the overall emissions target levels are
viewed as too strict, the government may choose to increase the
supply of permits, and in order to reduce allowable emissions the
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regulators

could take the opposite stance and reduce the supply of

permits.
Tradable

permit systems have been applied primarily

in the

U.S. under the EPA's Emission Trading program (bubbles, offsets,
netting

and banking),75 the nationwide phase out of lead

automotive fuel (which allowed fuel refiners to bank and trade
their lead content savings), and chloroflurocarbon
As already mentioned

(CFC) reduction.76

Congress has enacted a tradable permit

system for acid rain control under Title IV of the Clean Air Act
amendments
local "criteria"

1990.77 Other potential areas of application

include

air pollution control, water pollution control, control

of global climate change and recycling credits (some of which will
be discussed in detail further in this study).

c.

DEPOSIT REFUND SYSTEMS

Under the current waste control regulations,
consumers nor the producers

neither the

of waste materials pay disposal costs.

Thus, neither has an incentive to reduce waste. A deposit system
makes it more expensive to dispose of substances in landfills or in
oceans, by requiring that those who handle waste pay a deposit,
refundable upon the showing of safe disposal and recycling. The
EPA Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General principals for
creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814.
43,829 (1986).
76 See EPA, Regulation of Fuel and Fuel-Additives. 47 Fed. Reg. 38.078,(1982)
(proposed rule); 47 Fed. Reg. 49.322 (1982) (final rule) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §
80.20 (1988)).
77 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Pub.L. No. 101-459, § 401. 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).

75 See
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government

thus encourages

accumulation

of solid and hazardous

The environmental

effectiveness

depends on the percentages
refund systems
as "penalties
"rewarding

recycling

and discourages

the

wastes.
of a deposit refund system

of return. Due to their nature, deposit-

are relatively

attractive.

Whereas

charges

are seen

on bad behavior", deposit refunds have an element of
good behavior".

Whether these systems are an efficient

solution to environmental

problems

depends on a comparison

between the costs of those systems and the costs of alternatives
with equal environmental

results.

consists of the expenditures

Costs of alternative

systems

for household waste collection,

dumping and the expenditures

of picking up litter. Although no

assessments exist, it is not unreasonable

to assume that in many

cases such costs exceed the costs of a deposit refund system which
have the added advantage
for illegal "midnight

of eliminating

or reducing the incentive

dumping" which exists under a simple waste

tax or fee.
Nine states in the U.S., several Canadian provinces, and a
number of European nations have enacted "bottle bills" to control
littering of beverage containers and to reduce the flow of solid
landfills.78

Such systems can be used for some forms of

wastes. Lead acid batteries, used motor oil and vehicle
tires are also potential candidates

and a number of proposals are

78 See, e.g., P. BOHM, DEPOSIT REFUND SYSTEMS: THEORY AND APPLICATION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND CONSUMER POLICY 110-11 (1981); Menell,

'Beyond
the Throwaway
Society:
An Incentive
Approach
Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 678 (1990).
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now under consideration

in the Congress.79

Rhode Island and

Maine have enacted deposit refund systems for automobile
batteries, and Maine has a system for commercial-size

pesticide

containers. Denmark has adopted such a plan for high mercury
content and cadmium

batteries,

and Norway and Sweden have

implemented deposit refund systems for car bodies.8

D.

0

REDUCTION OF MARKET BARRIERS

In some cases, environmental
. simply by removing
activity. For example,

existing

protection

government

can be improved

barriers

measures that facilitate

to market

the voluntary

exchange of water rights can promote more efficient allocation and
use of scarce water supplies, while curbing the need for expensive
and environmentally

damaging

water supply projects.81

This

approach has recently been adopted in southern California in a
major market-oriented

water

exchange

program.82

(This approach

is examined in detail in the next section). This concept can usefully
be applied in the competitive
management.83

bidding for solid waste

Similarly, comprehensive

least cost bidding at

79 See, e.g., H.R. 2648, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONGoREe. S6636 (1989); H.R.
2462, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 136 CONGoREe. S4585 (1990)
80 1. OPSHOOR & H. VOS, supra note 73, at 83-88.
81 Willey & Graff, Federal Water Policy in the United States: An Agenda for
Economic and Environmental Reform, 13 COLUM. 1. ENVTL. L. 325, 349-51
(1988).
82 Morris, llD Approves State's First Water Swap With MWD, IMPERIAL VALLEY
PRESS, Nov. 9, 1988, at I, Col. 6.
83 If communities are to adopt efficient solutions to their solid waste
management programs, they must consider all methods, including surface
disposal, incineration, and recycling on an equal basis.

r
i

I
I

34
electric utilities
generation

would promote economically

and consumption

by mandating

rational

energy

the least cost approach,

whether on the supply or on the demand side. What is needed
before utilities will have incentives· to entertain such
comprehensive
regulatory

least-cost

agencies

bidding is permission

for utilities

from the state

to write demand-side

investments

into their rate basis.84

E.

ELIMINATION

OF UNWANTED GOVERNMENT

SUBSIDIES

In theory subsidies
incentives

can provide important

to address environmental

many subsidies

promote

inefficient

problems,

economic
but in practice

and environmentally

unsound

development. A major example is the U.S. Forest Service's "belowcost timber sales" which do not even recover the full cost of making
timber available

for harvesting

result has been inefficient

by private timber companies.

timber cutting on government

The

lands,

which has led to substantial losses of habitat and damages to
watersheds.85
economically

Other examples of programs that may be both
inefficient

and environmentally

unsound

include

84 National Energy Policy Act of 1989. S 24, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); See
also Cavanagh,
Ralph, Responsible
Power Marketing
in an Increasingly
Competitive Era, 5 YALE 1. ON REG. 342, 343 (1988).
85 See generally M. BOWES & J. KRUTILLA, MULTIPLE USE MANAGEMENT: THE
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FORESTLANDS 16 (1989); H. ANDERSON & C. GEHRKE, I
NATIONALFORESTS, POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, WATER QUALITY AND TIMBER
MANAGEMENT (Wilderness society, 1988).

!
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certain U.S. Army

Corps of Engineer's flood control projects,86 U.S.

Bureau of Reclamation

projects, and Bureau of Land Management

public lands grazing programs.87 Gradual

and Forest Service's

removal of these economically
unsound

subsidies

additionally,

inefficient

and environmentally

would foster environmental

increase

net federal

protection

and,

revenues.

86 See Stavins & Jaffe, Unintended Impacts of Public Investment on Private
Decisions: The Depletion of Forest Wetlands, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 337, 338 (1990).
87 See T. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT 47-52 (1983).

V.

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE

WITH INCENTIVE

ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICIES

Economic-incentives

for environmental

adopted and implemented

BASED

protection

have been

in the U.S. and several European nations,

though not on a very large scale. These experiences offer useful
guidance

as to the use of this approach in practice and can be used

to develop improved

policies.

EPA's EMISSION

TRADING PROGRAM

The EPA, starting in 1974, began to experiment with
"emissions trading" as part of its program to improve local air
quality. Firms that reduce emissions below the level required by
law have been allowed to receive "credits" usable against higher
emissions elsewhere.

The aim has been to allow polluters

greater

in choosing how to control pollution, so as to reduce
overall costs of pollution abatement. Until now, EPA's "controlled
trading options"

have included bubbling, netting, offsets and

Bubbles:
The bubble policy treats each plant as if it were surrounded
an imaginary bubble. The plant does not suffer any emissions
36
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violation unless there is an increase in the net emissions from the
entire plant.88 Thus, emissions from one smoke stack can increase
so long as there is a corresponding

decrease from another stack.

Firms are allowed to trade emissions reductions

among sources

within the firm, as long as total combined emissions have complied
with an aggregate limit.89 The main attraction of the bubble policy
is that a company can modify its plant and avoid being subject to a
new source review (NSR) by cutting back on another area of
emissions within the same plant.

2.

Netting:
The netting policy90 allows the facility to use its own credits

from surplus emissions reductions
for increases
facility.91

due to permanent

from that facility to compensate

modifications

within the same

The polluter must reduce emissions from another source

within the same plant so that the "net" increase in plant wide
emissions remains below the specified level. Thus while the bubble
policy creates the credits, netting ensures that the increase in
emissions is not above the limits. Netting accounts for the greatest
percentage of market activity to date.92 The bubbling and netting

88 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43830 (1986).
89 See generally R. LIROFF, THE BUBBLE CONCEPT (1981); Landau, Chevron, USA
v. NRDC: The Supreme Court Declines to Burst EPA's Bubble Concept, 15 ENVTL.
L. 285 (1985); Landau, Economic Dream or Environmental
Nightmare?
The
Legality of the Bubble Concept in Air and Water Pollution Control, 8 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 741 (1980).
90 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (1986).
911d.
92 See Hahn & Hester, supra note 68, at 132-33.
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policies were the first signs that the EP A would relax its no growth
stance in non-attainment

3

areas.

Offsets:
The offset policy allows economic development in non-

attainment areas «NAA)
minimum standards)
source emissions

areas that do not conform with the

through a system that offsets future new

with present reductions.93

This can be done by

utilities with their own sources or through agreements

with other

firms.94
Approval to use emission offsets are granted only if the applicant
meets four requirements.

First, the offsets should be such that they

result in reasonable

progress

towards

air quality standards

(NAAQS).95 Second, the new sources of

emissions must meet an emissions

attaining

limitation

national

ambient

that requires

compliance with the lowest achievable emissions rate for the type
of industry

involved.96 Third, the plan requires that all existing

emission sources owned by the applicant be in compliance with the
applicable

emissions

limitations.97

Fourth, the proposed offsets

a positive net benefit to the air quality of the affected
region.98

93 42 D.S.C. § 7503 (1988).
94 See Hahn & Hester, supra

note 68, at 119.
9S 41 Fed. Reg. 55,528, 55,529 (1976).
96 [d. at 55,524, 55,528.
97 [d. at 55,524, 55,529.
98 [d.
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4.

Banking:
Under the banking programs99

reduction

firms can store their emISSIOn

credits to allow either for internal expansion in the

future or for sale of credits to other firms. This provides flexibility
in the use of emissions reductions and allows a company to reap
the benefits of its own emissions cutbacks by using them to offset
future modifications,
growing companies

bubbling

or netting.100 Banking assists

in planning pollution control more rationally.

also allows states and communities
encourages

companies

this information
Although

It

to reap benefits because it

to create reductions

earlier and to disclose

to the state to help in emission control planning.10 1
all the above-mentioned

programs

were codified

in

the EPA's Pinal Policy Statement on Emissions Trading in 1986,102
they have not been extensively

used, partly because states are not

required to use them and partly because of the uncertainties
the future course of the programs. Nevertheless,

about

as of 1985, the

EPA had approved 42 bubbles and the states had approved 90. In
addition there had been approximately
netting

2000 offsets and 8000

transactions.103

In an early example of the success of this program, General
Motors (GM) sought to construct a new assembly plant that would
emit more than 3000 tons of hydrocarbons every year. OM was
99 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274, 3,280 (1979).
100Id.
101 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,825 (1986).
102 EPA's Final Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,829

(1986).
103 Hahn & Hester, The Markets for Bads: EPA's Experience
Trading, 11 REG. 48, 51 (1987).

With Emissions
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able to obtain ERC's that represented a reduction of 5000 tons of
hydrocarbon

emissions each year. Thus OM's new plant resulted in

3000 tons of offsets plus a 2000 ton per year net benefit to air
quality.104 Companies like Armco, DuPont, USX, and 3M have also
traded emissions
developed.IOS

credits, and a market for transfers

has

In 1987, Hahn and Hester calculated that this limited

degree of trading has resulted in more than $4 billion savings in
control costs, with no adverse effect on the air quality,l06
trading can be an affirmative

Emissions

tool to achieve environmental

objectives, building on the experience gained by using it to reduce
control costs.

B.

TRADABLE PERMITS FOR WATER POLLUTION

Though there is very limited experience
programs for controlling
this experience

from non-point

to date shows that these mechanisms

cost effective-methods
induce development
Non-point

water pollution

with tradable permit
sources,107

encourage

of control, lower total cleanup costs and
and adoption of new cleanup technologies.

sources,

particularly

from agriculture

and urban

run-off, now constitute a major U.S. water pollution problem. The
104 Yuonne F. Lindgren, The Emissions Trading Policy; Some on the Horizon
for Takings Clause Claimants, 18 HSTC. L.Q. 667 (1991).
105 See Main, Here Comes the Big New Cleanup, FORTUNE, Nov. 12, 1988 at 102,
103.
106 Hahn & Hester, supra note 103, at 50.
107 Pollution sources are of two types: (1) waste discharges from identifiable
points (point-sources)
and (2) diffused wastes reaching water through land
runoff, washout from the atmosphere, or other means (nonpoint-sources).
The two differ in their amenability to control. Discrete point-sources may be
controlled directly while nonpoint-sources
are extremely difficult to control.
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experience of the Dillon Reservoir, a major source of water for the
city of Denver, Colorado, provides an excellent example of a trading
approach

that works effectively

pollution.108

on non-point

source water

In past years, nitrogen and phosphorus loading was

causmg the reservoir

to become eutrophic,

sources from surrounding
available-technology

communities

standards.

even though point-

were controlled

by best-

To protect water quality in the face

of rapid population growth, the EPA and the state of Colorado
jointly

developed

a "point/non-point

program to cut the phosphorus
and agricultural

source control

optimization"

flows that mainly came from urban

sources.109

The point/non-point

source trading

program

was developed

with the active participation

of environmental

local and state governments,

and was approved in 1984 by the

Colorado legislature
publicly-owned

and the EP A)

sewage treatment

10

groups, industry

and

The program allows for

works (POTWs) to finance the

control of non-point sources in lieu of upgrading their own treated
effluents

to drinking

water standards.

1 11

The program is effective

because the cost per pound of phosphorus removed via trading is
$67; the cheapest alternative developed for the POTWs would cost
$824 per pound. EP A has estimated that the plan has made savings
of over $1 million per year compared with the conventional

108 NORTH WEST COLORADO COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, POINT SOURCES-NONPOINT
SOURCE TRADING IN THE LAKE DILLON WATERSHED, FINAL REPORT (1984).

109 See Hahn, Economic
Perceptions
of Environmental
Problems:
Patient Followed the Doctors Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95 (1986).
110Id.
111 Id. at 103.

How

the
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working of four fairly small POTWs.112 Furthermore, to provide a
margin of safety, a 2-to-l

ratio on trades is used, requiring controls

over a minimum of two pounds of non-point phosphorus for one
point of credit for a point source. As a result, the plan not only
saves money but also increases the likelihood of achieving
environmen tal
currently

improvemen t.113 The same type of program is

being developed

for nutrients

and other pollutants

at

other sites in Colorado and elsewhere.114

c.

LEAD TRADING

EP A's successful

lead trading program

approximates

the

economist's ideal of a freely functioning market. Lead, which EPA
decided to phase out in gasoline in the early 1970's, was one of the
first pollutants to be regulated under the Clean Air Act.1l5 This
program provided

greater flexibility

to gasoline refiners in meeting

emission standards during a time when lead in gasoline was being
reduced

significantly.

EP A authorized

inter-refinery

trading of lead credits in

1982.116 Producers were required to reduce lead in gasoline
according to a schedule, but those who did better than the schedule

112 See Hahn & Hester, supra note 27, at 395.
113 NORTH WEST COLORADO COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, A BASIN WIDE APPROACH
TO NSP POLLUTION MANAGEMENT, REPORT (1991).
114/d.
115 See MELNICK, supra note 43, at 269-81.
116 Environmental
Protection
Agency, Regulation
of Fuel and Fuel Additives,
47 Fed. Reg. 38,078 (1982) (proposed rule); 47 Fed. Reg. 49,322 (1982) (final
rule) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80.20 (1988)).
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earned lead credits that could be "banked" and/or sold to those for
whom it was more costly and difficult to achieve schedule targets.
Unlike other programs, the lead trading program had a fixed life
that started in 1982 and terminated
down was complete.
implementation

Although the program experienced

difficulties

they were relatively

related to the importation

earlier air and water emissions

that resulting

D.

some

of lead fuel,

minor and the program was clearly successful.

Trading among firms significantly

refiners participated

in 1987, when the lead phase-

surpassed

that resulting

from

trading.117 In 1985, over half of all

in trading with other firms and EPA estimated

savings were about $200 million annually.118

VOLUNTARY WATER EXCHANGE

One effective approach to water supply problems is to allow
the voluntary

exchange of water rights to increase efficiency,

notably by creating economic incentives

most

for water conservation.

In

the Imperial Irrigation District (lID) of California, farmers pay as
little as $10 for enough water to irrigate an acre of cotton, while a
few hundred miles away in Los Angles, local authorities are paying
as much as $200 for the same amount of water.119 A free market in
water rights allowing voluntary

exchanges

would help both parties:

Farmers will have a financial stake in conserving water, while

117 See Hahn & Hester, supra note 27, at 380-91.
118See U.S. EPA, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE: FINAL
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, Washington, D.C. (1985).
119 Stavins, Harnessing
Market Forces to Protect the Environment,
ENVIRONMENT Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 4.
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urban needs would be met without shrinking
without building

agriculture

and

new dams and reservoirs.120

In March 1983, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
published

a proposal calling for the Metropolitan Water District

(MWD) to finance the modernization
exchange

for conserved

years of negotiation,
transfer

agreement

of lID's water system in

water.121 In November 1988, after five

a $230 million water conservation
was finally

indicate greatly increased

and

agreed upon.122 Recent reports

interest in water marketing

in Colorado,

New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah and California.123

E.

CALIFORNIA

INITIATIVES

An important aspect of the Clean Air Act is its policy to
empower the states to tailor their own pollution control policies to
meet their individual

needs. This is done by setting air quality

standards, or national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), at
the federal level, and delegating to the states the task of creating
their own implementation
of initiatives
improve

plans.124 California has taken a number

under this provision to encourage market activities

to

the environment.

120 See Willey & Graff, supra note 81, at 345.

121R. STA VINS, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER: A PROPOSAL
FOR THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TO OBTAIN
ADDITIONAL COLORADO RIVER WATER BY FINANCING WATER CONSERVATION
INVESTMENTS
(1983).
122See

Morris, supra note 82.
123 See,e.g., Atchinson, Where Water is Money in the Bank, BUS.WK.,
1988, at 50.
12442 D.S.C. § 7410 (1988).

Aug.

15,
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The Air Resources Act (ARA) of California adopts an offset
policy125

and outlines procedures

for the registration

of emission reduction credits (ERC's).126 Furthermore,
legislature,
California
"substantial

and transfer
the California

via Public Utilities Code section 740.2, has directed the
Commission to encourage activities designed to achieve
market penetration

of electric

and compressed

natural

gas fueled vehicles".127 Also, the California Revenue and Tax Code
section 17052.11 provides tax credits of up to $750,000 state-wide
for converting

to low emission motor vehicles)28

improve California's

Such efforts to

air quality have resulted in renewed interest

in low emission vehicles (LIV's), especially because California's
traditional

lead in tightening

vehicle emission and air quality tend

to reach the other states in a domino-like effect.
California's

South Coast Air Quality Management District has

proposed a plan to permit the exchange of smog trading rights
among as many as 24,000 factories, refineries,
installations

that produce

nitrogen

bakeries and other

oxide and hydrocarbons,

the

major chemical ingredients of smog in the Los Angles Basin.129 This
is expected to be the first mass market in pollution trading and is
expected to go well beyond the existing trading schemes, including
the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act. All these plans are
125CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 40709 (Deering 1986).
An ERC is a permanent, quantifiable enforceable emISSIOns
reduction beyond the level required by regulations. This is the currency of
the emissions trading market approach.
127 Lori A. Burkhart, On the Road to a Cleaner Environment, 128 PUB. U.
FORTNIGHTLY,32 (1991).
126Id.

§ 40711;

128 Id.

129 Scott Armstrong, L.A. Smog: Pollution Trading in LA-LA Land. MONITOR.
June 12, 1991.
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relatively new, and the beneficial impact is difficult to measure. At
any rate they should provide a test of how well market
mechanisms

F.

curb pollution.

LAND TRUSTS

Land trusts are regional, local, state-wide and national nonprofit organizations
water resources

involved

important

land and

for the public benefit. They motivate land owners

to enter into conservation
major motivation

in protecting

easements

to protect the environment.

of entering into these easements,

of nature, is self-interest.

A

besides the love

In return for the easement rights, land

owners may realize economic incentives in the form of federal and
state income-tax

and estate-tax

benefits. The growing interest in

land trusts can be attributed largely to the existence of these tax
incentives. There are now more than 900 land trusts in the U.S ..
Their rapid growth has helped to protect 2.7 million acres of land in
the U.S. so far. A Land Trust Association 1990 survey indicates that
between 1988 and 1990 the number of land trusts increased
percent, helping preserve

G.

an additional

by 20

30 percent land.130

OTHER EXAMPLES

Experience

with market principles

goes well beyond the

SIX

examples noted above. Congress has been creating new incentive130 Note, Land Trusts Have Helped Protect 2.7 Million Acres, EXCHANGE,
Spring 1991.
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based legislation for a diverse set of problems. These include: (1)
EPA's tradable
Protocol's

permit system for implementing

stratospheric

ozone-depletion

the Montreal

restrictions,131

(2) the

Battery Research and Recycling Act of 1989 that requires motor
vehicle battery wholesalers
from the purchasers
government

and retailers

to accept old batteries

of new ones and authorizes state and local

adoption

of motor vehicles

deposit-refund

systems,132

and (3) the Consumer Protection Recovery Act of 1989 that
combines recycling
with tradable

targets for municipal and solid waste disposal

permits

in order to distribute

recycling

manner.133 This latter act has also

among firms in a cost-effective

prompted some states to adopt a deposit-refund
beverage

system for

containers.

Elsewhere,

a number of European nations including West

Germany, France and The Netherlands,
incentives

burdens

for environmental

European Commission

have used economic

protection.134 An expert panel of the

studying

market incentives

recommends

the

use of economic market incentives including taxes, so as to
integrate environmental

il

policy into all economic

policy-making.135

131 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566, 30,567 (1988); See also Hahn & MacGartland, The
Political Economy
of Instrument
Choice: An Examination
of the U.S. Role in
Implementing
the Montreal Protocol, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 592, 598-604 (1989).
H.R. 3735, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
133 135 CONGoREC. § 6636 (1989).
134 See generally J. OPSCHOOR & H. VOS, supra note 73.
135 See note, Interview:
Europe
Will Integrate
Economics
GREENWIRE,July 24, 1991.
132

and

Environment,

VI.

ANALYSIS OF A SELECT MODEL (THE ACID RAIN
TITLE)

Title IV, the acid rain title of the Clean Air Act Amendments
1990,136 is a landmark of innovative clean air legislation. It is
Congress'

first market-based

section evaluates

A.

approach to pollution control. This

the market system established

under this Title.

GENERAL STRUCTURE AND WORKING

Title IV involves the free trading of sulphur dioxide (S02)
"allowances" which is expected to provide flexibility,
conservation

efficiency

and

in solving pollution problems. It authorizes EP A to

issue sulphur dioxide emissions allowances each year to existing
units covered by the Act. Each allowance is a transferable license to
emit a ton of sulphur dioxide)37

The allowances are expressed in

tons per year rather than an emission rate, such as pounds per
hour, or milligrams

per liter. Annual allowances facilitate the

assessment of the cumulative effect of sulphur dioxide on the
environment; it is the total acid loading on a lake that causes
acidification,
atmosphere

not the concentration
at any particular

of sulphur dioxide in the

time. License transferability

gives the

136 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
137 § 402(3), 403(b), 42 V.S.C. § 7651a(3), 7651b(b).
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industry

the flexibility

of the year

without

To ensure
regulations

to distribute
sacrificing

such as new plants,

sources.

To enforce

allowances
penalties

on plants

encourages

new plants

rain regulations
electric

cover

steam

megawatts.

1.

I

Phase

emissions

provisions

Allowance

I, beginning
electric

limit on such

the limit.139

exceed

from other
fossil

with a capacity

of

harsh

This

units.

The acid

fuel-fired

of at least 25

are to be implemented

10

two phases.

Allocations

January

utility,

other

and imposes

most new and existing
stations

from

the law limits the total number

to buy allowances

generating

These

Phase

110 large

whose

by the new

an overall

each year to 8.9 million138

issued

the course

goals.

achieved

emissions

the Title places

this ceiling,

policy

reductions

by increased

sources

emISSIOns over

environmental

that the emission

are not offset

their

high

1, 1995, will cover
sulphur

approximately

dioxide-level-emitting

plants

that are listed in Table A of section 404 of the Clean Air Act
Amendments.140
which

provides

multiplied
annual

They will receive
each unit with

by the units

fuel

consumed

Utilities

will

baseline

allowances

allowances
fuel

in 1985 through

according

equal

to a chart

to 2.5 Ibs/MMbtu

consumption

(the

1987, expressed

average
in millions

of Btu.).

incentives

be provided

to encourage

with

vanous

them to use scrubbers

138 § 403(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a).
139 § 411, 42 U.S.C. § 76510).
140 §§ 404(a)(1), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 7651(k).

allowance-based
on their

units.

Units
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that agree to install scrubbers by 1997 need not reduce emissions
until 1997 instead of 1995.141 Such units will also receive a twofor-one bonus allowance; one bonus allowance for each ton of
emission reduction
Lbs/MMbtu

that they may achieve below the 1.2

emission

level.142 These allowances can also be banked

for future use. The sum of bonus two-for-one
extra allowances

allowances and the

issued under this scheme may not, however,

exceed 3.5 million tons.143 The allowances may be awarded to the
utilities as and when they are earned. This procedure

gives utilities

the incentive to complete their compliance plans early. All this
maximizes the scope of alternatives
complying

with their emission

Utilities

such pollution sources have for

limitations

that use energy conservation

requirements.
measures or renewable

energy to reduce emissions, even before they are covered by the
acid rain regulations,
to these incentive

will receive extra allowances.144

allowances,

In addition

some extra allowances per year will

also be allocated among utilities in Indiana, Ohio and Illinois during
Phase I, in proportion to each utilities Phase I allowances.145

2.

Phase

II

Allowance

Allocations

In Phase II, beginning January 1, 2000, all utility units with
output capacity of 25 M.W. or more will be included in the
allowance trading scheme. This phase provides more allowances
141
142
143
144
145

§
§
§
§
§

404(d)(1), 42 V.S.C. § 7651c(d)(1).
404(d)(6), 42 V.S.C. § 7651c(d)(6).
404(a), 42 V.S.C. § 7651c(a).
404(f) , 42 V.S.C. § 7651c(f).
404 (a)(3), 42 V.S.c. § 7651c(a)(3).

to
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relatively

clean

the baseline

units

period.

and to units with low utilization
For example,

less than

60 percent

period146

or had emission

receive

bigger

several

other

compliance
technologies

allowance

plants
the

million

after November

special

that would

for

the Phase

II

damage.149

Most units that
for

except

those

that were

under

construction

their

sulphur

dioxide

emissions

these

from similar

units

on

new
or from

market.

allowances).

rata basis,

formulas

factor

15, 1990, are not eligible

with Phase

II, the emissions

tons per year (not counting

allocation

can

capacity

and extends

environmental

To cover

Beginning

If the total number

in an aggregate

exceeds

otherwise

trading

amount

has been criticized
the existing

the total

proportionately

equal

at 8.9

and bonus

the limit,

to the excess

be made to maintain

by giving

will be capped

the special

for each unit will be reduced

cap on the emissions
inhibit

on a 60 percent

will have to buy their allowances

open

at

by four years to units that will use new

allocations,

date.150

that

based

of plants148

to reduce

operating

that operate

the 1985-87 baseline

during

It also contains

categories

deadline

capacity

units

during

rates below· 1.2 Ibs./ MMbtu,147

allowances

for 2000-2009.

baseline

begin

of their

coal-fired

rates

on a proallocations

the cap. IS! Although
on the ground

sources

the

that it may

an incentive

to retain

146 § 405(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(d)(2).
147 § 405(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(d)(3).
148 § 405(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(h); § 405(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(i); § 405(j), 42
U.S.C. § 7651d(j).
149 § 409, 42 U.S.C. § 7651h.
150 § 403(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(e).
151 § 403(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a).
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excess

allowances,152

it ensures that the realized reductions are

permanent.

Furthermore,

allowances

is essential for the development

3.

Establishing

a limit on the available

emissions
of the market.153

a Market

The central and most innovative feature of the acid rain
legislation

is the right to transfer emissions freely.154 This is the

key both to the strong environmental policy sought in this law and
to the flexibility it creates in choosing the best means of complying
with their emissions

obligations.

should reduce overall compliance
the utilities with the opportunity

The allowance market's flexibility
costs substantially

and provide

to save money and even profit.

Since units can gain revenues from the sale of allowances they do
not use, they will have a strong financial incentive both to make
greater-than-required
than

reductions

and to make reductions

earlier

required.
A utility may also make an intra-utility

allowance transfer,

where it may re-assign allowances from one unit to the other, if the
re-assigned

results total no more than the original total emissions.

This provision gives the utility the flexibility to focus its pollution
control activities

on facilities where emission reductions

achieved most cheaply. It stimulates
technologies

innovations

can be

in the

and the strategies used to reduce emissions

and

152 Temple, Baker & Sloane, Inc., Economic Evaluation of H.R. 3030/S. 1490:
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, (prepared for The Edison Electric
Institute, August 1989).
153 S. REP. NO. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 324 (1989).
154 § 403(b), 42 D.S.C. § 7651b(b).
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encourages

sources to exploit energy efficiency,

control technologies
emissions

promoting
measures
compliance

and fuel switching. Utilities can reduce their

by installing

technologies,

enhanced emissions

scrubbers, using clean coal innovative

building cleaner plants, buying power from others or

conservation.

Utilities can select those corrective

that they are most comfortable

with and schedule their

efforts as and when they like within the year.

The new sulphur dioxide allowances system operates like a
checking account that is monitored only at the end of each year and
that carries forward the unused allowances to the next year .155
This banking of allowances enables utilities to benefit from overcompliance

in any given year.

Allowances
representatives

are freely transferable

among designated

of the owners or operators of the affected sources

or any person who holds the allowance.156 The act uses very broad
language in describing

the persons who can transfer these rights.

But transfers will not go into effect until they are registered with
the EPA.157 The law imposes no geographic restrictions on the
transfer of allowances. For example, a utility in Georgia can buy
allowances from a utility in California and vice versa.

4.

Auctions

and

Direct

Sales

To foster a private allowance trading market and to ensure
that utilities which are building new units have access to

155 § 403(b), 42 D.S.C. § 7651b(b).
156 [d.
157 [d.
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allowances, the law requires EPA to sell a small number of
allowances each year; some at auction and others on a fixed price
on a first come first serve basis.158 EP A will auction 150,000
allowances

each Phase I year, and 200,000 allowances each Phase

II year. 50,000 allowances for 1995 will be auctioned in 1993 to
1995 and 150,000 will be auctioned for each year between 1996
and 1999. For each Phase II year, 100,000 of the allowances will be
auctioned

seven years in advance and the remaining

100,000 will

be auctioned in the year for which the allowances will be issued. 159
Under the sale provisions, EP A will sell 50,000 allowances for each
Phase II year at $1,500 per ton. Half of these are to be sold seven
years before they mature, starting 1993 and the other half for
immediate use, beginning in the year 2000. Priority will be gIven to
the utilities that show that they have been unable to buy
allowances
financial

5.

in the open market,160 All this could open enormous
resources

Monitoring

for the government.

and

Enforcement

Requirements

All units covered by the act must ensure continuous

readouts

of all emissions by installing emissions monitors. This emissions
monitoring

has been compared to a bank's responsibility

to keep

track of its transactions to the smallest unit, the penny. CEM
systems, therefore, must enable a company to account for, and the
EPA to keep track, of sulphur dioxide emissions and allowances "to

158 § 416, 42 D.S.C. § 76510.
159 § 416(c), 42 D.S.C. § 76510(c)
160 [d.
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the penny". Phase I units must install the monitors by November
15, 1993 and Phase II by January 1, 1995.161

The allowance

system attempts to reverse the economic

equation so that the sources have an Incentive to comply, and the
provisions

of this section will be crucial in determining whether a

source has complied or not. The enforcement
requirement
reductions

also allows the EPA to ensure that emissions
by sellers match the emissions increases

Since the buyers will need to demonstrate
they have acquired sufficient
emissions,

and monitoring

allowances

by buyers.

by the year end that
to cover their annual

there will be a built-in incentive to record and report

emissions.162
the monitoring

The language of the bill specifically states that when
system is not working, the sources will be presumed

to be emitting at an uncontrollable

rate.163 Thus, there is an

incentive to have monitors working all the time because, if they are
not working the source's emissions will be presumed to be quite a
bit higher and will erode all credits.

6•

Excess

Emissions

Fee

Utilities that exceed their limit shall be required to pay a
penalty of $2000 for each excess ton and a reduction of the
following years allowances by an amount equal to the excess.164

For

example, if a utility receives 400 tons of allowances every year, but
161 § 412, 42 V.S.C. § 7651k.
162 See note, Acid Rain, Emissions Trading and the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1989, 15 COLUM. 1. ENVTL. L. 329, 345-55 (1990).
163 § 412(d), 42 V.S.C. § 7651.
164 § 411,42 V.S.C. § 7651k.
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emits 500 tons of sulphur dioxide in the year 2000, the excess
emissions will be deducted from the 400 ton allowance it will
otherwise

receive for the year 2001. This payback requirement

designed

to ensure that cumulative

sulphur dioxide emissions

IS

do

not increase. As the continuous monitoring system is capable of
detecting

violations,

the financial penalty for excess emissions,

combined

with the requirement

offset by emissions reductions
as a significant

B.

that any excess emissions will be
in the following year, should serve

deterrent to potential

COMPARATIVE

violators.165

COMMENTS

Title IV provides utilities with an enormous opportunity
creatively

choose various alternatives

regulations.

to comply with the

Utilities can benefit greatly by choosing to enter into

joint ventures
control

to

with other utilities,

equipment

manufacturers

industrial

and other interested

control and reduce their emissions,
mutually beneficial

sources, pollution
parties,

to

thereby bringing about a

system and a least cost allocation of control

burdens. It is important, however, for the utilities to choose the
best mix of strategies and to consider a wide variety of
institutional,

regulatory

and planning

considerations

to decide how

best to comply with the title.

165 Permit violations may also be subject to administrative, civil or criminal
enforcement actions. S 1490, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1989); S 1630, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1989).
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For markets to function properly, there must be a proper
to support it.166 First, there must be an

blend of active participants
adequately

large number of traders with enough need for

allowances to ensure that some will buy and some will sell. Second,
they must have an incentive to trade. Finally, the transaction
low to maintain the incentive.167

must be sufficiently

costs

For the

transaction costs to be low buyers and the sellers should be able to
easily identify

each other, and accurate information

must be

readily available to the buyers so they can make a cost benefit
analysis.

Ideally,

trading procedure

rules should be uniform from

state to state.
The amendment
among the entities

within the regulated

number of regulated
transaction
partners.

fulfills all these conditions.

industry and the limited

sources under the scheme should lower the

costs of sales by simplifying
Further,

The similarity

the amendment's

searches for transaction

combination

standard sales can aid the development

of auctions

and

of a price indicator, helping

the utilities in making a cost benefit analysis. Another factor
influencing

the transaction

costs is the simplicity of the trading

process. For example, if every trade requires the extensive paper
work and approval
transaction

through

numerous

bureaucratic

costs would escalate. Here, extensive

complex procedures

are unnecessary

channels,

the

oversight or

as the permits held by

sources are like accounts held with EPA. When a trade is made, the

166 See Hahn & Noll, Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution
Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 66 (1983).
167 See Hahn & Hester, supra note 68, at 140-41.
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buyer's account is credited and the seller's account is debited by
the trade. This system is no more complicated than a normal
checking

account.

Other potential
been mitigated.

weaknesses

of the trading system have also

For example, the problem of hoarding is minimized.

The trading region of this system covers the entire country, while
competition

of the regulated industry is normally only at the local

level. Thus, it is unlikely that the participants

can ever manipulate

the market to erect a barrier to competition. A new plant should
easily be able to find a seller in a different part of the country. The
annual auction and the direct sales of allowances also ensure the
availability

of allowances

provisions

at regular intervals. The acid rain

also protect against the possible localized

concentrations

of pollution that may cause health effects or may cause other local
environmental

impacts, as the program is an overlay on a pre-

existing program and works in a range where the threshold for
protection

against localized effects has already been achieved.

In sum, the amendment's

market scheme is designed for

success. It embodies a strictly guarded emissions cap, a simple
trading process, incentives
manageable

compliance

to encourage active trading and a

method. However, success or failure of the

system will depend substantially
program.

Its rule-making

on how the EP A administers

and the implementation

designed to allow the regulated participants

process

to efficiently

the

must be
access the

benefits inherent in the trading program. If so, this market
approach to the acid rain program will shape large segments of U.S.
environmental

law and regulation

in the future.

VII.

ISSUES OF SPECIAL FOCUS

This part details several new approaches to deal with some
urgent environmental
traditional

problems

that have eluded solution

by

policy measures, and develops a series of

recommendations

as to how economic strategies could be useful

tools with which to approach these problems.

A.

SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT

Serious problems
solid and hazardous

are arising from the massive quantity of

waste now being generated. They include

among others: shortages of capacity of landfills and other
conventional

means of disposing of municipal solid waste; human

exposure to toxic substances

found in hazardous

and industrial

solid waste; and ecological impacts from improper hazardous waste
disposal. According to a report issued by the EPA, more than one
third of the nation's landfills will be full by the end of 1992.168
With landfill capacity on the decline, many states have turned to
incineration

as a means of solving their solid waste problems, but

concerns exist that garbage burning contributes
problems and generates

hazardous

to air pollution

ash which must itself be

168 See U.S. EPA, THE SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 8 (1989).
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disposed

of safely.169 Despite the magnitude of the problem,

Americans continue to generate and dispose of more solid waste,
both per capita and total, than the residents of any other country
on earth.170 It has been estimated that between 1970 and 1988,
the total quantity of disposed solid waste grew more than 37
percent, with discards per capita growing by 14 percent.171
The sources of toxic substances released into the environment
are both numerous and diverse: every day each of us uses a variety
of products
estimates

and services which generate hazardous wastes. Most

place the total annual hazardous

waste generation

between 250 to 500 million tons.172 Another perspective

at

on the

size of the problem is provided by the costs associated with various
regulations

aimed at cleaning up or maintaining

best available

estimates

disposal sites. The

indicate aggregate national cleanup costs in

the range of $300 to $750 billion by the year 2000.173
At the core of most of these problems are flawed price signals
which fail to bring to the attention of consumers and producers the
real costs of the wastes they generate. The cost of throwing away
an additional item of refuse has been zero. Residents merely need
to place their waste in the trash can or at the curbside and this
waste disappears

when the municipality

picks it up. Although there

169 See Yakowitz & Harvey, Incineration
of Municipal
Solid Waste: Scientific
and Technical
Evaluation
of the State-of-the-Art
by an Expert Panel, 4
Resources,
Conservation
& Recycling
241-252 (1990).
170 See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1986,252 (1986).
171U. S. EPA, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1990 UPDATE, 6 (1990).
172U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT:
RECENT CHANGES AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES, Washington, D.C., May 1985.
173 See U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 1987, op. cit..
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are costs of disposal that people pay, 174 these costs are not related
to the quantity or the toxicity of the waste they throwaway.
The government at all levels has been slow to respond to this
crisis, but many states, municipalities

arid the federal government

have started taking some action. In 1990, Congress introduced

75

bills dealing with the problem and EPA announced a national goal
of reducing solid waste by 25 percent by 1992 and 50 percent by
1997 via recycling,175 Many states and localities have also adopted
a variety

of command-and-control

increase

recycling,

systems

for beverage

strategies

to limit waste and

and nine states have enacted deposit-refund
containers.176 Although these policies

respond to some of the symptoms of the solid waste "crisis" they do
not systematically
distorted

address its causes, since they fail to remedy the

incentives

that underline

consumer

behavior which foster the "throwaway
environmental
traditional

and manufacturer

ethic". Given the

and direct private costs of disposing of wastes by

means, it is important

to provide appropriate

incentives

for those who generate and manage the waste to economize in their
use of materials,

make better use of wastes they generate and

dispose of the remaining
Fundamental

wastes in environmentally

sound ways.

to an effective waste management

strategy is

the removal of these distortions by getting the prices right.
Decisions

by consumers

and firms should reflect the incremental

costs of waste disposal. The following approaches (some already in
174 See D. WILSON, WASTE MANAGEMENT: PLANNING, EVALUATION, TECHNOLOGIES
31 (1981).
175 See U.S. EPA, supra note 171.
176See BOHM, supra note 78.
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place in a few places) hold promIse for accomplishing this, each
focusing on a different point in the product life cycle:

1.

Unit

Prices

For

Waste

ColleCtion

Under this program households

and businesses

pay for

disposal based on the volume of waste they generate.l77 This
creates a strong incentive to reduce the quantity of waste
generated,
products

either through changes in purchasing
and containers.

households

habits or reuse of

It also provides incentives

to separate the recyclable

components

for the
of their trash.

Unit pricing programs are in place in Seattle,Washington
Pennsylvania.178

Pennsylvania

and

has adopted a "bag and tag" system

which allows households to dispose of refuse only in specially
designed trash bags sold by the municipality.

This program has

been very successful, with the total amount of waste falling by 60
percent in the program's

first year and the total costs decreasing by

40 percent.179 A corollary approach adopted in Seattle allows the
customers to choose from four sizes of cans which are charged
differently.180

However, it can be a little problematic as customers

are charged for a full can even if it is only partially filled, giving
them the incentive to fill a can. To remedy this problem, Seattle IS
177 See Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An incentive
Approach to Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655 (1990).
178 See Skumatz, Lisa A., Variable Rates: Using Your Rate Structure to
Encourage Waste Reduction and Recycling, Presentation
to GRCDA
Conference Feb 14, 1990.
179 See Paul, Bill, Pollution Solution: Pennsylvania Town Finds Way to Get
Locals to Recycle Trash, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 2, 1989.
180SEATI'LE SOLID WASTE UTILITY, PUBLIC INFORMATION DEPARTMENT.
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM DESCRIPTION, Seattle
Washington
(1991).
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now experimenting
customers

with weight-based

rates under which the

are charged according to the weight of the waste they

generate, to be measured by meters placed in the specially
designed

trash cans.

Unit pricing has obvious limitations in case of those multi-unit
dwellings

where residents

can dispose of their waste anonymously,

thus free riding on the charges paid by others. In such situations,
unit charges at the building level can at least provide incentives to
landlords

to encourage

generation.

residents

to conserve on their waste

There may be some limitations

can be overcome

by taking different

and obstacles but these

approaches.

Whatever

the

approach, an accurate unit pricing of municipal solid waste
provides

a promising

approach

that combines

with a minimum amount of inconvenience

2.

Retail

Disposal

And

Virgin

cost-effectiveness

to those affected.

Material

Charges

The retail disposal approach levies a fee at the point of
product purchase to cover the cost of waste disposal. Such
programs can be used where the unit price curbside collection
approach is impractical
residences

due to the prevalence

of large multi-unit

or where the full cost of disposal is disproportionate

to

its volume.
Compared with unit prices, retail disposal charges have the
potential

advantage

of removing

incentives

for illegal dumping,

since disposal costs would be incurred by individuals
products

were purchased,

when the

not when they were thrown away. There

are, however, some critical concerns associated with them. For
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example, it is questionable

whether charges would be set high

enough to influence consumer behavior. It is also not possible to
know the social disposal cost at the time of purchase since the cost
depends on where and how the consumer uses and disposes the
prod uc 1.181 Further such programs are likely to be complicated to
implement

with consequently

high administrative

costs. So it seems

unlikely that such charges would have much impact on purchasing
and disposal habits and resulting

solid waste problems.

Another strategy would be the imposition
charges at the point of production.182
firms and consumers

of virgin material

This would encourage both

to switch to materials and products with

lower disposal costs. It would also encourage recycling as the vIrgIn
materials would cost more that the other ones. A principal
advantage

of the virgin material charges would be their relative

ease of administration,

particularly

disposal charges. A disadvantage
insensitivity

to local conditions,

in comparison

with retail

of this system would be its
since these charges would be

needed to be computed on a standardized

national basis. Therefore,

while virgin material charges may be effective in creating demand
for recyclable

materials, they may not be as effective as unit prices

in encouraging

the right mix of recycling and disposal technologies.

3.

Recycling

Credit

Programs

Recycling is an important element of viable waste
management
181 See Menell,
182 [d.

strategies

since it reduces the amount of solid waste

supra note 177.
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that ends up in landfills. However, as more states and
municipalities
recovered

adopt recycling

materials

programs,

the increased

supply of

has often outpaced demand in secondary

markets. Without a buyer, recyclable

garbage is still garbage.183

Much of the pollution

and waste now entering the environment

results

products

from consumer

automobile

such as newspapers,

used

oils, tires, and many others which can be recycled but

are not due to weak recycling markets and lower cost opportunities
for plain disposal.
Recycling

credit programs would set recycled content goals

for the industry and allow the private sector to determine the least
cost approach of meeting the goals. Under this approach, firms
trade and sell credits to reach overall industry recycling goals.
Producers
purchase

and importers

who lack the current capacity to recycle

such credits from recyclers either indefinitely

or until it

becomes economic for them to develop recycling facilities either on
their own or in a joint venture.184

The result of this tradable permit

program would be that the total costs of compliance are less, since
the firms in the best position to recycle are essentially paid by
other firms to undertake the bulk of the recycling burden.
Recycling credit systems can be used for a variety of products
such as newspapers,

lead acid batteries, lubricating

oil and tires.

For example, a tire recycling credit program establishes
uniform

content

requirement

for all manufacturers

some

and uses

183 See, e.g., Gold, Allan, As Trash is Recycled Where Can it All Go?, NEW YORK
TIMES, Oct 3 1990 p. B4.
184 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONGo REC. S 16514 (1989).
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tradable

permits

while providing
Similarly,
establish

to achieve
substantial

industry-wide
flexibility

aggregate

to individual

firms.185

a lead acid battery recycling credit program would first
a recycled

content standard and then allow individual

firms to meet their targets by purchasing
manufacturers

4.

standards

who exceed

Deposit-Refund

credits from battery

their targets.186

Programs

Under a deposit-refund

program, consumers

charge or deposit when purchasing

pay a special

specific goods, that is refunded

after the product is turned in for recycling or proper disposal. This
system is optimal for hazardous products which pose a significant
threat to health or ecological impacts, for which the prevention of
improper disposal is particularly

important. The size of the deposit

can depend on the social cost of the product being disposed of.
These systems have the advantage
government's
preventing

monitoring

of greatly reducing the

burdens from a nearly impossible

illegal dumping, to assuring that the products

one of
being

returned for refund are what they are alleged to be. Further more
firms are provided
damaging

substances

apply, thus speeding
Deposit-refund

with incentives

to look for less environmentally

on which the deposit-refund
up research

system does not

for substitutes.187

systems are currently

employed

In the form

of "bottle bills" in nine states in the U.S. and several provinces of
185 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 136 CONGoREC. S 4585 (1990).
186 See generally

Marshall, Stewart, Elliott & Hawkins, supra note 61.
in the Management of
Hazardous Wastes, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. (1988).

187 See Clifford S. Russell, Economic Incentives
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Canada. In Michigan, for example, the return rate of containers was
95 percent after its first year of operation,188 and in Oregon
littering

was greatly reduced.189

Deposit-refund

systems have beeri proposed for a variety of

products, but are most effective for products like lead acid
batteries,

certain industrial

improper

disposal impose very high costs.190 They offer the

advantages

chemicals

of being self-financing

and lubricating

and promoting

oils whose

decentralized

actions to correct improper disposal.
For most communities the best way to address the solid and
hazardous

waste crisis is to ensure that the consumers bear the

true costs of disposing of their refuse. The above programs make it
possible to impose such costs on the consumers while at the same
time significantly

B.

reducing

the administrative

costs and burdens.

FEDERAL WATER POLICY

The severe droughts experienced

in California last year and

two years ago in other parts of the West make clear that water is
not an unlimited resource. Surface reservoirs in many parts of the
country have been drawn down to record low levels, and
overdrafts

of numerous

contamination

188 See

aquifers is accelerating.

of ground water, acidification

Toxic

of lakes, and global

Porter Richard, Michigan's
Experience
With Mandatory
Deposits
on
Beverage Containers, 59 LAND ECONOMICS 177 (1983).
189U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOLID WASTE: TRADEOFF INVOLVED IN
BEVERAGE CONTAINER DEPOSIT LEGISLATION, GAO/RCED-91-25 (1990).
190 See Clifford S. Russell, supra note 187.
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warming

have further compounded

of dwindling

the array of unsolved

problems

supplies, polluted surface waters, and declining

aquatic and wetland habitats for fish and wildlife. Unfortunately,
federal water policies

have intensified

and not lessened these

problems.191

1.

Incentives

For

Improved

Supplies

Under the current system, there are no incentives
water users to take actions consistent
environmental,

to induce

with current economic,

and social values associated

with water resources.

This lack of appropriate incentives results in inefficient use of
existing supplies, as individuals do not bear the full social costs of
their daily water use decisions. Just as free markets for other goods
result in the efficient availability

of those goods, when and where

needed, water markets can facilitate

the availability

of supplies at

the least overall cost,192
An effective

approach to current water supply problems is to

support development
the voluntary

of federal and state policies which facilitate

buying and selling of water rights by individuals,

firms and other organizations,
for water conservation

thereby creating

economic

incentives

in order to increase the efficiency of the

system. A market for water works like any other market. Owners
of water supply offer their water for sale and users offer to buy it,
with the two parties negotiating an agreeable price. As this type of
transaction
191 See,
192 [d.

is repeated

by many other buyers and sellers, an

Willey & Graff, supra

note 81.
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efficient

and competitive

water market develops

which balances

supply and demand without the need for government
water distribution.
environmental

Creating

control over

water markets would provide

benefits in two ways: first, by reallocating

existing

water supplies to new demands thus reducing the need for
additional

water-storage

facilities

and second, providing

for making an efficient use of water and encouraging
The experience
Metropolitan

conservation.

of an agreement between farmers and the

Water District in the Los Angles Area, discussed in

chapter V demonstrates
interest

incentives

the potential

in marked-based

of this approach.193

water transactions

elsewhere

Increased

in

California and in Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah
reflect the fact that they can work well in many situations.194
are voluntary

agreements

that reflect the judgement

They

of the parties

involved, that mutual benefits can be realized. Many of the
informational
the parties

costs necessary to realize the benefits are borne by
themselves

and these transfers

bring about a more

efficient use of scarce resources.
A concern with the use of these markets is that the economIC
values of water resources are well defined for some resources,

but

not for others.195 Water transfers can, however, be used for direct
environmental

benefits

as demonstrated

193 See Moriss, supra note 82.
194 See Atchinson, supra note 123.
195 See Willey & Graff, supra note 81.

by the Nature
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Conservancy

which has begun an active program of acquiring water

rights to areas that carry critical habitat.196
Another
transfers
marketing

important

concern

regarding

holds promise

consequences

of aggregate

economic

2.

of negative
10

the

It will therefore be essential for changes in federal and

while facilitating

Incentives
Market-based

improving

and environmental

for some areas including rural communities

state law to provide adequate protection
interests,

water

is their potential impact on third parties. While water

benefits, this does not exclude the possibility

West.197

market-oriented

For

voluntary

Improved

mechanisms

to such third party

exchanges

of water rights.

Quality
can be used effectively

for

not just the quantity but also the water quality

problems that we face today. Most of the water pollution control
laws in the U.S. have been directed exclusively at point sources,
such as factories

and municipal

waste-treatment

facilities.

Because

municipal landfills and toxic waste dumps in the U.S. cause a
significant

amount of non-point contamination

water and surface water supplies,

of both ground

the various recommendations

for

solid and hazardous problems discussed in section A of this chapter
address this concern as well.

196 See Wigington, Robert, Update on Market Strategies for the Protection of
Western lnstream Flows and Wet Lands, Natural Resource Law Center, June.
1990.
197 See Oggins, Cy R. & Helen M. Ingram, Does Anybody Win? The Community
Consequences of Urban-to-Rural Water Transfers: An Arizona Perspective,
Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, Univ. of Arizona, Tucson, May 1990.
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Market mechanisms can also be utilized to combat water
pollution from point sources. Most of the water pollution control
laws are directed exclusively

at point sources; while holding each

source to specified limits, they do not restrain the total volume of
discharges

within a basin. They rely primarily

issued by regulatory

agencies, with pollution limits based on the

available control technologies.
improved pollution
watershed

on discharge permits

They fail to provide incentives for

control devices. The establishment

limit and the implementation

of tradable

of an overall
permits

it may be the best way to achieve water quality goals)98
developing

within

While

this system, it would be useful to take guidance from

the tradable

permit system established

for acid rain control under

Title IV of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990) 99
Dispersed

non-point

sources, including

offs, have not been adequately

addressed,

farms and urban run-

in part because these

sources are much more difficult to control, particularly

methods.200 While tradable permits may work

conventional
effectively

by

for point sources, the problems with implementing

for non-point

them

sources are significant. First, there is frequently little

data available with which to establish baseline emissions levels;
second, monitoring

can be particularly

difficult and; third in some
cases it may be difficult to identify responsible parties.201 More
198 See the discussions for tradable permit systems for acid ram reduction
chapter VI.
199 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat.
2399 (1990).
200 See Willey & Graff, sup ra note 81.
201 Peskin, Henery M., Nonpoint
Pollution
& National
Responsibility,
83
RESOURCES 10 (1986).
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conventional

regulatory

policies

should therefore

play a dominant

role in defining and enforcing permits, but given the current
shortage

of viable approaches

approaches

to nonpoint sources pollution,

should at least be considered

market

in certain situations.

The experience of Dillon reservoir, the major source of water
in the city of Denver (already discussed in chapter IV), provides an
excellent

example of the trading approach working effectively

for

both point and non-point source of pollution. The same type of
program can be developed
water

c.

elsewhere for nutrients

and for other

pollutants.202

GLOBAL WARMING

(INTERNATIONAL

TRADING

PROGRAM)

Of the many environmental
the beginning

problems that have arisen SInce

of the industrial revolution,

few have posed greater

risks than the threat of global climate change due to the
greenhouse effect. As a result of our activities, the concentration

of

certain gases like carbon dioxide (C02) and other greenhouse gases
like methane (CH4), nitrous oxides (N20), and chloroflorocarbons
(CFC) are increasing,

augmenting

raising the possibility

of climate changes across the globe. Despite

the near universal

scientific

greenhouse

there remains

effect,

the rate, magnitude,

the greenhouse effect and thereby

agreement

about the theory behind the

substantial

uncertainty

timing and regional implications

202 See supra notes 108 & 109.
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of future
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climate changes caused by human activities. It is well within the
realm of possibility,

however, that climate changes will be large

enough to engender

significant

social, environmental

and economic

costs.203
The industrialized

nations are primarily

responsible

for the

buildup of these gasses in the atmosphere though in the future,
emissions

from developing

nations will match and eventually

surpass those in the developed world. The most troubling obstacle
to address this problem has been how to allocate control
responsibilities
X percentage
predictable

among nations. If we make a uniform pledge to an
of carbon dioxide worldwide, that would have very

and differential

effects on individual

countries.

Countries like China and India which have large indigenous sources
of coal would find it very difficult to meet that pledge in
comparison

to other countries.

A system of an international

trading program in greenhouse

gases would be an effective way of allocating the costs of global
warming prevention

among nations and would give countries

a

good deal more flexibility to deal with the problem in a way that
does not have clear winners or losers, but a more level-playing
field.204
countries,

It would be more equitable than an approach requiring all
rich and poor, new and old contributors

to environmental

hazards, to use the same control technology. A tradable permit
program would be a new application
approaches

of the market-based

already applied in the U.S. to lead-permit

trading

203 See Jill Jager, Anticipating Climate Change, ENVIRONMENT, Sep. 1988.
204 See Marshall, Stewart, Elliott & Hawkins, supra note 61, at 147.
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among refiners

and sulphur dioxide trading for acid rain

prevention.
Under this program, nations would be gIven individual
targets and allowed to achieve them by reducing emISSIOns or
purchasing

credits from others who could reduce them more

economically.
obligations
variety

Individual

countries

could thus achieve their control

through any means chosen and thus accommodate

of separate

national

implementation

program would allow for 'aggregate'

strategies.

greenhouse

uniformally-

the concern is on aggregate pollution levels, as

opposed to specific emissions from individual
to the contribution

This

pollution reduction at

minimum cost to the society at large. With essentially
mixed air pollutants,

a

sources. With regard

to potential global warming of the different

gases, carbon dioxide is the largest in volume but

accounts for a little less than half of the overall effect, because
carbon dioxide molecules are the least potent of the greenhouse
gases. CFC's, methane, nitrous oxide and ozone are all more potent
per molecule.205

In addition forests, for example, can produce

carbon when they are burnt or chopped, or can absorb it when they
are expanded.
Under this program one can work out an equivalence
these contributions
by international

among

to global warming and then set for each nation,

negotiation,

its commitment

to meet a performance

goal. Any goals will certainly be a matter of great debate as
developing

nations need more latitude and a bigger allowance to

205 See Stewart & Wiener, A Comprehensive
Approach
AM. ENTERPRISE 70, Nov.-Dec., 1990 pp. 75-80.

to Climate

Change.

I
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expand. Whatever

the allowance, the key advantage of this

approach will be that each country has the flexibility to decide on
the mix of measures it wants to use. Some could concentrate on CFC,
some on carbon dioxide and some on forests.206 For example,
countries like Brazil or Indonesia might find it economically
attractive,

as well as environmentally

or to implement

forestation

sound to retard deforestation

programs in order to earn credits

which their own industries could use or which they could sell to
foreign

governments.

The revenues from sales to these countries

could be used to finance programs of forestation. Countries like the
U.S. could invest in new energy generation facilities in India

that

reduce carbon dioxide and would earn a credit against the global
climate change allowance which could be shared between the two
countries.

This approach would ensure that reductions

would be

achieved at the least total cost and that no nation is unduly
burdened by the costs of emission reduction. It would also provide
a means of transfering
developing

resources

and technology,

or the less developed countries,

particularly

to the

through a competitive

market.
The most difficult problem associated with this program, as
with any other greenhouse-gas
agreement

control program, will be achieving

on both the global emissions cap and individual

control obligations.

The trading program highlights

national

this problem

because it makes it more explicit. Since the program would create a
new environmental

206 See

"currency" (e.g. tons of carbon dioxide), every

Marshall, Stewart, Elliott & Hawkins, supra

note 61.
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nation will know immediately
variety

of alternative

its reduction responsibilities.

allocation

mechanisms

A

have been suggested,

including allocations based on gross national product (GNP), total
land area and emissions.207

population,

Most proposals for

allocating control obligations among nations call for higher rates for
emissions

reductions

developing

by industrialized

countries.208

Issue of establishing

countries

than by most

Any convention will have to deal with the

global and national baselines.

A formidable challenge that this program faces IS the
establishment

of effective

monitoring

and enforcement

prOVISIOns

that are essential for the proper working of this program. Even
basic monitoring

of compliance will be a formidable challenge.

Perhaps an international
establishment
obligations
negotiating

agency would be needed to do the job. The

of such an agency and the allocation of control
would be an extremely difficult task before those
the international

framework

these or other design problems
advantages

agreements.

overshadow

offered by an international

Whether

the potential

greenhouse

gas permit

trading program will depend in part, on the skill of those
negotiating

the international

framework

agreements.

Grabb, The Greenhouse
Effect: Negotiating
Targets, London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1989.
208 See, e.g., Flavin, Slowing Global Warming:
Worldwatch
Paper 91,
Washington D.C. Worldwatch Institute, Oct. 1989.

207 See

CONCLUSION

VIII.

A market-based
consumers

approach to pollution control can lead both

and producers to consider the full social costs and

consequences

of their decisions,

control technology,

encourage progress in pollution

save the policy makers from the endless

proceedings

on technical

government

attention

issues that overwhelm them, and keep

focussed

on important

issues, such as how

much pollution control should be achieved. All this is needed if the
United States is to maintain both economic growth and good
environmental

quality.

As we enter the last decade of the century, policy makers,
environmentalists,

and private industry

new, more market-oriented

approach

all seem receptive
to environmental

to a

problems.

We see a strong consensus emerging that carefully designed
market-oriented
environmental
possible
Although

approaches
protection

will often be able to achieve greater

at lower costs to the society than is

with command-and-control
command-and-control

regulations

policies

on their own.

have attained

some degree

of success, they often pit economic and environmental

goals against

each other. These goals should supplement each other if either of
them is to be achieved.
Just as command-and-control
problems,

policies pose a distinctive

so too do market-oriented

77

approaches.

set of

In general these

78
economic-incentive
functioning

policies depend on the existence of well-

markets. For example, if the market for tradable

permits is thin or if the transaction costs are high, the outcome may
be less efficient than anticipated. Firms must be able to identify the
right trading partners

and the legal constraints

on trading should

be minima1.209 Also, it must be accepted that incentive mechanisms
are not appropriate
localized

pollution

for all problem areas. For example, highly
problems that may pose significant

human health, may more appropriately
conventional

command-and-control

dangers to

be dealt with by

approaches.

Furthermore,

it

IS

not enough to identify policies that are cost effective. Several other
necessary

steps need to be taken for ensuring that priorities

more intelligently.

are set

For example, the key to EP A's decision to

eliminate lead in gasoline was an economic analysis performed In
EP A's office of Planning and Policy Evaluation showing that the
move would achieve major health benefits at little or no net cost.210
Other factors that must be considered

include the equity

effects of the policy, geographical regions, their impacts on the poor
etc. It may be appropriate

in some instances to compensate

who are harmed by the introduction
under a tradable-permit

pollution

those

of these policies. For instance,

control program,

the initial

209 Under the acid rain provlSlons, the broad geographic extent of the
market and the fact that trades can be made on a one to one basis with
relatively few restrictions are designed to promote active trading. The report
of the Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works on Sl630
concludes that "all indications are that the market for allowances will be
economically competitive and highly robust. See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 19 (1989).
210 See, Stewart, Economics,
Environment
and the Limits of Legal Control, 9
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1985).
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allocation

of emission permits can be designed to favour those

firms that would otherwise
with a uniform
permits

generate

suffer the greatest losses. Compared

standard approach to pollution
efficiency

control, marketable

gains that can help compensate

those

who are most harmed by a regulation. Taking all such steps will not
necessarily

impose

BAT approach
question

greater

burdens

that presently

is whether

increased

on administrators

from the

prevails.211 Even if they do, the
administrative

costs are outweighed

by greater benefits to the society as a whole. The development

by

EP A of the bubble and trade-off policies required additional
information

gathering,

analysis and other efforts. But the payoff

has been enormous with the bubble alone saving over $700
million212

and inspiring new ways of cleaning up pollution.

In short no single approach,
and-control

whether market-based

or command-

can be the ultimate for the diverse environmental

and

natural resource problems that we face. The real challenge is to
choose the right policy or combination of policies for each problem.
Numerous opportunities

exist, but each must be assessed on a case

by case basis. We must develop a clear understanding

of the

211 For example, in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments,
Congress imposed uniform technology-based
standards to avoid the
transaction costs and implementation
problems involved in policing
environmental quality standards. In order to simplify decision making the
act ignored variations in water quality uses and goals. In implementing the
act however the EPA felt compelled to consider these variations and set
separate standards for over 500 different industries, a majority of which
were challenged in court. Long delays in implementing the statutory scheme
resulted. See also S. Melnick, supra note 43, at 193-205.
212 See R. LIROFF, THE BUBBLE POLICY AND EMISSIONS TRADING: THE TOLL AND
TROUBLE OF REGULATORY REFORM (1985).
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problems we face before we begin our search for appropriate

tools

of public policy.
In many respects, the real work lies ahead. The design of
effective

and practical

market-oriented

strategies

based on the

criteria set out here, will require the active participation
diverse

environmental

activists

and private

community.
industry

Regulators,

representatives

of the

environmental
must take up this

important

but difficult

challenge of designing effective,

equitable

and truly feasible policies and programs.

efficient,

Congress has taken the first step with Title IV of the Clean
Air Act Amendments

1990. Although a modest beginning,

down the highly productive

path of a market-approach

it starts

to pollution

control. It may be a model for flexibility in future environmental
regulatory

activities.

implementation,
difficult.
federal

The steps that remain in the design and

will not only be more important but also more

The receptive
and international

to the great challenges

mood towards market solutions at the state,
levels portends
of environmental

real progress

with regard

pollution.
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